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INTRODUCTION
Private actors play an important role in transnational economic activity,
and corporations are one of the dominant vehicles through which private
actors participate in the global economy. Corporations wield tremendous
economic, political, social, and legal influence. Some transnational
corporations have more economic, social, political, and legal clout than
many developing countries. The amount of money at stake gives
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corporations a strong incentive to engage in politics through means ranging
from lobbying to bribery. The policies of corporations can directly
stimulate or dampen urban development, promote or hinder access to
education, and support or thwart family cohesiveness. Large corporations
have the human capacity and economic resources to engage in complex,
long-term legal strategies to influence law-making in a manner that is
beneficial to the corporations' interests.
Transnational corporations operate in and are subject to the laws of
multiple jurisdictions. As creatures of the state, the rights and obligations of
corporations are determined in the first instance by the domestic law of their
state of incorporation or real seat of business. Transnational corporations
- corporations that own, operate, or control business ventures in countries
other than the country in which they are incorporated or have their real seat
(their "home country") - are subject to additional laws. In addition to the
national law of the countries in which they operate, transnational
corporations are subject to international law, such as international trade law
and foreign direct investment law.
Although trade and foreign direct investment law are inherently
intertwined, they followed very different paths in the second half of the
twentieth century. In 1948, eighteen national governments signed the
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs ("GATT").' In 1995, 128
countries signed the World Trade Organization Agreements ("WTO
Agreements"), which included the 1994 update of the GATT.2 By 1998,
153 of the approximately 195 countries in the world had become members
in the World Trade Organization ("WTO") and membership continues to
grow.3 The WTO serves as a point of convergence for all international trade
issues. Under the umbrella of the WTO, a series of agreements and a body
of cases have developed to govern international trade and the resolution of
trade disputes. In contrast, efforts to create an international organization to
address foreign direct investment issues have been unsuccessful. Although,
international trade law developed and matured, multilateral foreign direct
investment law stagnated.
Foreign direct investment remains underregulated and underenforced.
There is no comparable international body shaping foreign direct investment
law and handling disputes. Foreign direct investment policy-making
continues to rely heavily on neoclassical economic theory. Under the
I. Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Cuba, France, India, Luxembourg,
Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, South Africa, Sri Lanka, United
Kingdom, United States of America, and Zimbabwe.
2. World Trade Organization [WTOJ, GATI Members, http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto-e/gattmeme.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2009) (listing the 128 countries that
had signed GAT by 1994).
3. See WTO, Understanding the WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
whatis e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2009).
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neoclassical economic development model,4 foreign direct investment will
promote prosperity around the world, and so it should be promoted by
minimizing government intervention. In practice, this means minimal laws
and regulations.
However, despite inhibited regulatory development and cycles of
deregulation, many of the anticipated benefits for developing countries and
their citizens have yet to materialize. True, laws encouraging foreign direct
investment contribute to technology transfer, increased tax revenues, and
other economic benefits. However, existing laws are lax, one-sided, or
limited in scope. They allow transnational corporations to cause harms such
as property damage, personal injury, and significant environmental
damage.' Insufficient protections and limited avenues for redress encourage
transnational corporations to chase profits with limited concern for
consequences.6
Legal scholarship on foreign direct investment often follows lines of
inquiry that dovetail with neoclassical economic theory and prioritizes the
protection of investments by transnational corporations.7 Legal scholarship
addresses issues ranging from attracting foreign direct investment to
balancing differing interests of more developed and less developed
4. In the neoclassical economic development model, economic development and
prosperity can be promoted through economic policy that reduces regulation and limits
intervention in private economic activity.
5. For purposes of this article I have depicted foreign direct investment with broad
brush strokes. However, the types and extent of harms or benefits from foreign direct
investment vary from sector to sector and region to region. Foreign direct investment also
affects different groups differently, for example, by gender. See generally U.N. Research
Inst. for Soc. Dev., Foreign Direct Investment, Development and Gender Equity: A Review of
Research and Policy, Occasional Paper No. 12 (Jan. 2006) (prepared by Elissa Braunstein).
Exploring foreign direct investment through the lens of specific sectors, regions, and specific
groups offers an avenue to develop more nuanced recommendations for a mandatory legal
framework for Global Corporate Citizenship. See, e.g., Rachel J. Anderson, Gender, Foreign
Direct Investment, & Global Corporate Citizenship, WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. (forthcoming
2010) (manuscript on file with author). I will explore specific sectors, regions, and affected
groups in future articles. For a more detailed discussion of future research, see generally
Rachel J. Anderson, Global Corporate Citizenship: A Research Agenda (Working Paper
Series, 2009), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract= 1477137.
6. See generally Justice Ian Binnie, Legal Redress for Corporate Participation in
International Human Rights Abuses, 38 THE BRIEF 44 (2009), available at
http://www.icj.org/lMG/20091022093202185.pdf. This problem is exacerbated by a general
lack of international civil law. See also Christopher L. Blakesley, Criminal Law: United
States Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Crime, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1109 (1982)
("[I]nternational law has tended to focus on penal rather than civil jurisdiction.").
7. See Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining
the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 640 (1998)
("Although a substantial academic literature related to [bilateral investment] treaties exists,
there has been surprisingly little analysis of the impact of BITs on the welfare of the
countries that have signed them.").
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countries.' The common thread remains the extent to which host states
should protect or circumscribe the rights of transnational corporations to
secure a hospitable atmosphere for foreign direct investment. This
emphasis neglects the interests of individuals and communities in
developing countries.9
The narrow approach to regulating foreign direct investment law
proscribed by neoclassical economic theory and the corresponding
circumscribed approach in legal scholarship are counterproductive to the
point of being harmful. One of the most common forms of foreign direct
investment law, the bilateral investment treaty, is generally structured to
protect transnational corporations from acts of expropriation or
naturalization by host country governments without adequate compensation.
Bilateral investment treaties and the scholarship that analyzes them tend to
omit societal stakeholders, such as individuals and communities affected by
businesses owned, operated, or managed by transnational corporations.
Plaintiffs alleging harms by transnational corporations face substantive
and procedural hurdles. The United States is one of the primary venues to
bring claims against transnational corporations. This is particularly true
when the defendant corporation is incorporated in the United States. The
Alien Tort Statue provides an opportunity to seek redress in U.S. courts
against U.S. corporations.' ° However, many claims do not rise to the level
of violating the law of nations, as required under the Alien Tort Statute)'
8. See, e.g., Kojo Yelpaala, In Search of Effective Policies for Foreign Direct
Investment: Alternatives to Tax Incentive Policies, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 208 (1985);
Gloria L. Sandrino, The NAFTA Investment Chapter and Foreign Direct Investment in
Mexico: A Third World Perspective, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 259 (1994); Richard J.
Hunter, Jr., Robert E. Shapiro & Leo V. Ryan, C.S.V., Legal Considerations in Foreign
Direct Investment, 28 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 851 (2003); Ted G. Telford & Heather A. Ures,
The Role of Incentives in Foreign Direct Investment, 23 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
605 (2001); Kevin A. Hassett, The Role of Trade & Foreign Direct Investment in
Development, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 355 (2004).
9. See, e.g., Amanda Perry-Kessaris, Enriching the World Bank's Vision of National
Legal Systems and Foreign Direct Investment, 2, Jan. 30, 2008,
http://ssm.com/abstract=1087547 (discussing the World Bank's disregard for "the fact that
legal reforms designed to attract investors may be [sic] impede the ability of other actors,
such as civil society representatives, to pursue their individual objectives through the legal
system").
10. The applicability of the Alien Tort Statute to corporations is disputed. Petition
for Writ of Certiorari at 10-1l, Abdullahi v. Pfizer, No. 09-34 (2d Cir. July 9, 2009), 2009
WL 2173302 (arguing that there is a circuit split on the question of corporate liability under
international law).
II. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States."). The law of nations is the Eighteenth Century term for what we
now call customary international law. William S. Dodge, After Sosa: The Future of
Customary International Law in the United States, 1, Nov. 13, 2006,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=944245. "Customary international law results from a general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation."
[Vol. 18:1
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Thus, cases brought by plaintiffs alleging cultural genocide, certain human
rights violations, and international environmental torts may be dismissed for
failure to state a claim under the Alien Tort Statute. 12 Allegations of
violations of rights to life, health, and sustainable development are also
deemed by U.S. courts not to rise to the standard of violating the law of
nations.' 3 In addition to dismissal due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
many cases in U.S. courts are dismissed on the basis of forum non
conveniens, where a court determines that an alternative forum would be
more appropriate. 14 This example highlights some of the challenges facing
plaintiffs seeking redress for alleged harms that result from the operations of
transnational corporations.
This Article argues for the reform of foreign direct investment law and
proposes a new approach as a step toward a mandatory legal framework.
Modern foreign direct investment law is a vestige of the colonial era during
which early forms of transnational corporations emerged. Unlike
international trade law and despite the dramatic developments of the
twentieth century, foreign direct investment law remains largely unchanged.
Prior multilateral efforts to implement comprehensive foreign direct
investment law reforms have been largely unsuccessful. However, in recent
years, growing political will has emerged under the umbrella of Global
Corporate Citizenship and related movements.
Global Corporate Citizenship emerged in management and business
scholarship in the 1990s, but has not yet entered the legal discourse to any
significant extent. Theories of Global Corporate Citizenship address the
ethical responsibilities of companies operating in a global market and the
values that should guide corporations' engagement with society.
Management and business scholars propose Global Corporate Citizenship as
a voluntary framework that should be adopted by officers and directors
because it is good for business. Theories of Global Corporate Citizenship
offer a useful perspective with which to reframe and reform foreign direct
investment law.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §102(2) (1987).
In the context of the Alien Tort Statute, this applies most clearly to "certain offenses
recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade,
attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism
.... Id. § 404. Customary international law is not static but rather it changes over time.
12. See, e.g., Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997)
(dismissing the case without prejudice for failure to state a claim under the Alien Tort Statute
because cultural genocide, certain human rights violations, and international environmental
torts are not widely accepted as violations of the law of nations).
13. See, e.g., Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 253 F. Supp. 2d 510, 515-19 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (finding that claims of violations of rights to life, health, and sustainable development
did not violate the law of nations and dismissing the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction).
14. See Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, Is There an Emerging Fiduciary
Duty to Consider Human Rights?, 74 U. CIN. L. REv. 75, 82-83 (2005).
2009]
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This Article has three sections. Section I, Early Flaws and Subsequent
Failures, explains the origins of asymmetries in foreign direct investment
law through the birth of the transnational corporation in the shadow of
colonial economics and imperialist theory. It highlights a subsequent lack
of global leadership and corresponding failures to reform foreign direct
investment law. Finally, Section I briefly sets out the current state of
foreign direct investment law. Section II, Efforts to Regulate Transnational
Corporations, identifies the existence of political will to reform foreign
direct investment law expressed in decades of multilateral and private sector
reform efforts. Section II helps to flesh out a trend toward regulation of
transnational corporations in which some voluntary efforts are successful
but mandatory requirements have not yet been achieved. Section Im,
Transforming Foreign Direct Investment Law, outlines the emergence of
Global Corporate Citizenship theories in the management and business
fields as a voluntary movement. Section III proposes Global Corporate
Citizenship as an alternative theory that can inform efforts to develop
mandatory regulations for transnational corporations in foreign direct
investment law.
This Article is part of a larger project on Law and Global Corporate
Citizenship analyzing ways to reform the regulation of transnational
corporations. This series of articles identifies gaps in the international and
domestic regulation of transnational corporations, explores reasons for these
gaps, provides a Global Corporate Citizenship framework for more
comprehensive regulation, and develops proposals for the implementation
of a mandatory legal framework.
I. EARLY FLAWS AND SUBSEQUENT FAILURES
A. Vestiges of a Colonial Heritage
Historically, the purpose of foreign direct investment law was to protect
the rights of investors. Protection of investors' rights encourages direct
foreign investment by private actors. Foreign direct investment is seen as
risky because private actors, whether as individuals or in the form of a
corporate entity, are not on equal footing with the state in which they own,
manage, or operate a business. Alone, private investors are often unable to
protect their foreign assets against expropriation, the taking or modifying of
their property rights by the government of a host country, or nationalization,
the transfer of control or ownership of their assets to the government of a
host country. Historically, military and political clout of a private actor's
home country or some form of international agreement protected the rights
of private actors.
Foreign direct investment law retains vestiges of the colonial era during
which early forms of transnational corporations, colonial trading companies,
were formed. During the colonial era, colonized peoples and territories
were generally not accorded rights that were equivalent to those claimed by
[Vol. 18:1
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colonizing peoples and nations. Asymmetries in modem foreign direct
investment law can be traced back to the economic and legal contexts in
which early forms of transnational corporations emerged.' 5
Seventeenth century colonial trading companies are the predecessors of
modern transnational corporations. 6 Colonial trading companies received
their charters from a colonial sovereign, were headquartered in a colonizing
nation, and operated in a colonized territory. During the colonial period,
private trading companies engaged in foreign direct investment and
international trade under the auspices of their home governments.
Protections for this early form of foreign direct investment by colonial
trading companies were asymmetrical. Military power, colonial
governments, and international treaties protected the rights and assets of
colonial trading companies. Governments of colonizing countries also
protected the property rights of colonial trading companies through state-to-
state diplomacy. The rights of the inhabitants of colonized territories were
not equally respected by colonizing countries and their representatives,
colonial trading companies.
British and Dutch colonial trading companies are examples of early
forms of transnational corporations. The company, now commonly known
as the British East India Trading Company, 7 engaged in commercial
activities in India under an English Royal Charter granted in 1600. For
example, the British East India Trading Company's activities included the
operation of a pepper factory in what is now Indonesia for approximately
eighty years.' 8
The Dutch granted charters to two "Indian Trading Companies." In a
structure that would become entrenched in colonial economics, each
company had a dedicated sphere of control, operation, and influence. The
Dutch East India Trading Company' 9 carried out commercial activities in
15. Transnational corporations significantly influenced the economic development of
the host countries in which they operated - as colonies and later as independent states. See,
e.g., Rachel Anderson et al., The Caribbean and the Banana Trade, in BANANA WARS: THE
ANATOMY OF A TRADE DisPuTE (Timothy E. Josling & Timothy G. Taylor eds., 2002)
(discussing, among other things, the role of transnational corporations in the banana industry
in the Windward Islands).
16. See Lan Cao, Corporate and Product Identity in the Postnational Economy:
Rethinking U.S. Trade Laws, 90 CAL. L. REV. 401, 428 n.108 (2002); cf PETER T.
MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 19-20 (1995); Yitzhak Hadari,
The Structure of the Private Multinational Enterprise, 71 MICH. L. REV. 729, 735 (1973).
17. The formal name under which the company received its charter was the
"Governor and Company of Merchants of London Trading into the East Indies." This formal
name reflects the fact that the companies exercised sovereign powers. See ANTONY ANGHIE,
IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 68 (2004).
18. The pepper factory was established in Bantam in 1901 and was operated by the
British East India Company until Bantam was captured by the Dutch in 1682. JOHN F.
RIDDICK, THE HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA: A CHRONOLOGY 126, 129 (2006).
19. The formal name under which the company received its charter was the
"Vereenigde Oost-lndische Compagnie."
2009]
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Asia, and the Dutch West India Company2" did the same in the Caribbean.
The Dutch West India Company also engaged in the slave trade in Africa,
Brazil, the Caribbean, and North America.
In the course of their commercial activities in colonized territories,
colonial trading companies engaged in activities that we would now
describe as human rights violations. They used child and forced labor.
They engaged in slavery,21 torture, and summary execution. In addition, the
colonial trading companies often protected their investments with their own
private security forces. Many private security forces perpetrated substantial
bodily and other harm on individuals and communities in colonized
territories.
Colonial trading companies' discretion to shape their operations in
colonized territories often was not circumscribed in any meaningful way by
domestic or international law. Colonial trading companies possessed broad
powers that were inextricably linked with the governance of the colonized
territories in which they operated.22 Colonizing nations posited that
individuals and communities indigenous to colonized territories stood
outside the community of "civilized nations." Colonizing nations,
therefore, claimed that the people and communities in the colonized
territories should not benefit from the rights and protections accorded to
citizens of the so called "civilized nations. 2 3  This lack of checks on
colonial trading companies contributed to an environment in which the
pursuit of economic wealth trumped the values of civilized society and even
human life.
Harms perpetrated by colonial trading companies foreshadowed many
harms resulting from the acts of modem transnational corporations.
Although modem transnational corporations are now incorporated rather
than chartered, they continue to enjoy many rights possessed by colonial
trading companies. Modem transnational corporations violate human rights
and harm the environment in the course of their operations in developing
countries, the successors of the colonized territories.24  The lack of
20. The formal name under which the company received its charter was the
"Geoctroyeerde Westindische Compagnie."
21. See, e.g., PAUL E. LovEJOY, TRANSFORMATIONS IN SLAVERY: A HISTORY OF
SLAVERY IN AFRICA 135 (2d ed. 2000) ("In the early years of the colony [at Cape Town], the
Dutch East India Company owned most of the slaves at the Cape, who were used to maintain
the port facilities, and the [Dutch East India] Company always remained the largest single
owner of slaves.").
22. See PETER WARREN SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE
PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY 34 (2008).
23. For a discussion of the theories and jurisprudence regarding the exclusion of non-
Christians and people not of European origin from the law of nations, see ANGHIE, supra note
17, at 52-65.
24. See, e.g., Sarah A. Altschuller & Amy Lehr, Corporate Social Responsibility, 43
INT'L LAW. 577, 580-87 (2009) (discussing recent litigation alleging corporate complicity in
human rights abuses in China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Nigeria,
[Vol. 18:1
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applicable foreign direct investment law combined with jurisdictional
limitations often hinders potential plaintiffs alleging harms by transnational
operations in less developed countries from seeking redress.
Modern foreign direct investment law retains asymmetrical legal
protections that are its colonial heritage. More developed countries replaced
colonizing countries as the more politically and economically advantaged
group of nations. Less developed countries replaced colonized territories as
the less politically and economically advantaged group of nations.
Although the terminology changed, the asymmetrical power and rights
relationships remained. Individuals in more developed countries are
afforded more rights and protections against the excesses of transnational
corporations. Individuals in less developed countries have fewer rights and
protections against acts of transnational corporations that are incorporated in
or have their real seat in more developed countries. This asymmetry is
exacerbated by the fragmentation of foreign direct investment law on the
international level.
B. Lack of Global Leadership
A lack of global leadership impeded the development of a
comprehensive multilateral framework for foreign direct investment law.
The twentieth century presented several distinct opportunities to reform
foreign direct investment law. Although some opportunities were utilized to
develop institutional and legal frameworks for international trade, national
governments did not exploit these same opportunities to achieve a
comprehensive reform of foreign direct investment law. As a result, foreign
direct investment law and international trade law followed widely diverging
paths since at least the mid-twentieth century.
The lack of political will among colonizing nations, and later more
developed countries, to develop a comprehensive framework for foreign
direct investment law is consistent with theories of imperialism underlying
the colonial model. A legal framework balancing the rights of all interested
parties is antithetical to the dominion of one group over another that is a
central and foundational element of imperialism. Colonial trading
Papua New Guinea, and South Africa). However, this is not to suggest that transnational
corporations are always or inherently harmful. Transnational corporations do not operate in
a vacuum but rather within legal, social, and economic structures. See Colin Marks & Nancy
Rapoport, The Corporate Lawyer's Role in a Contemporary Democracy, 77 FORDHAM L.
REv, 1283, 1281-84, 1283 n.93 (2009) (discussing a tripartite approach to the legal, ethical,
and economic responsibilities of corporations). Entrenched inequities and weak rule of law
inhibit investment and the enforcement of rights and protections for individuals and
communities in many developing countries. See, e.g., Rachel J. Anderson, Comment,
Linking the Rule of Law and Trade Liberalization in Jamaica, 7 AFR.-AMER. L. & POL'Y
REP. 49, 51-52 (2005) (discussing the effects of Jamaica's history of democracy and weaker
rule of law track record).
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companies acted with the permission, and often explicit approval, of their
national governments. Therefore, it is not surprising that effective action
was not taken to limit the power of and regulate the operations of colonial
trading companies in colonized territories.
Adopting a principle of limited interference helped governments of
colonizing nations reap the benefits of imperialism and colonial commerce.
At the same time, the principle of limited interference allowed governments
of colonizing nations to turn a blind eye to egregious acts perpetrated by
colonial trading companies. This principle of limited interference in
transnational economic activity of private actors remains embedded in
modem foreign direct investment law.
The international community missed an opportunity to reform foreign
direct investment law during the period following the First World War. It
was an era of reconstruction. In the post-World War I period, the rights of
private actors regarding their foreign assets were a subject of dispute
between national governments. One camp, which included the United
States and the United Kingdom, believed that private property should be
protected and that expropriation required compensation under customary
international law." Another camp, which included Russia and countries in
Latin America, believed that a state's rights to expropriate and nationalize
trumped the interests of private actors in foreign assets.26 These two camps
did not resolve their differences in the post-World War I period.
In the United States, the U.S. government missed opportunities to reform
foreign direct investment law during the period following the Great
Depression. It was an era of increasing regulation of investment activities.
After the 1929 stock market crash, the U.S. Congress passed the Securities
Act of 1933 to ensure investors' access to information and legal recourse in
the case of fraud or illegality.2 7 This act was followed shortly thereafter by
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which created the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") and gave the SEC broad oversight and
enforcement powers. 28  However, the regulations promulgated in the
Securities Act of 1933 and those promulgated in the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 focused on protecting shareholders and potential investors and
not on protecting individuals and communities in developing countries.
25. See Andrew Newcombe & Lluis Paradell, Historical Development of Investment
Treaty Law, in LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT
12-14 (Kluwer Law Int'l 2009).
26. This position would later be recognized in a U.N. Resolution. See, Permanent
Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), 4, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess.,
Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (Dec. 14, 1962).
27. Securities Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2000); see also U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission, The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry,
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Sept. 8, 2009).
28. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2006); see also U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission, The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry,
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtm (last visited Sept. 8, 2009).
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They did not extend protections for non-investors harmed by the foreign
operations of transnational corporations.
The period following the Second World War was another missed
opportunity to reform foreign direct investment law. It was an era of
transformation. Participants at the U.N. Monetary and Financial
Conference at Bretton Woods created several institutions in an effort to
create a global economic system. These institutions included the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ("World Bank")
and the International Monetary Fund. 29  The U.N. Economic and Social
Committee also proposed an International Trade Organization to address
international trade and investment. 30  However, these efforts were
unsuccessful in part because of continuing disagreements about standards
for investment protection, compensation for expropriation, and minimum
standards for treatment of foreign direct investment. 3' These differences
remained unresolved during the post-World War II period.
After World War II, decolonization resulted in the political independence
of many countries in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Latin America, and the
Middle East. It was an era of reform. This was an opportunity for newly-
independent, developing countries to exercise their sovereign rights and
advocate for the rights of and protections for their citizens and
32
communities. However, developing countries began to compete for
foreign capital prompted by a belief that international investment facilitates
economic growth and prosperity.33  This competition benefitted
transnational corporations and their home countries.
29. Gerald M. Meier, The Bretton Woods Agreement - Twenty-Five Years After, 23
STAN. L. REV. 235, 235 (1971); International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1944),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/ibrd-articiesofagreement.pdf;
International Monetary Fund, Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund
(1944), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm.
30. U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, Havana Charter for an International
Trade Organization and Final Act and Related Documents, 14, 19-21, 65, 125 (Nov. 1947-
Mar. 1948), UN Doc. ICITO/1/4/1948, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/
legal-e/havana.e.pdf.
31. See Newcombe & Paradell, supra note 25, at 19-20.
32. In 1962, the United Nations recognized the right of sovereign nations to
nationalize investments in their national resources. G.A. Res. 1803(XVII), U.N. Doc.
A/5217 (Dec. 14, 1962). See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 7, at 648 ("From 1962 through the
mid 1970s, the United Nations General Assembly-dominated by LDCs-passed a series of
resolutions intended to emphasize the sovereignty of nations with respect to foreign
investment.").
33. Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman & Beth Simmons, Competing for Capital:
The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 265, 299
(2008) ("This competition is driven by the desire of developing countries to participate in the
global capitalist system.").
2009]
HeinOnline -- 18 Mich. St. J. Int'l L. 11 2009-2010
Michigan State Journal of International Law
Transnational corporations and their home countries have a resource that
is mobile and in high demand: foreign capital. 34 This allows transnational
corporations to shop for the most hospitable political and legal environment
for their operations, which, in turn, contributes to a race to the bottom in
terms of the regulation of foreign direct investment in host countries.
Competition for foreign capital creates an incentive for governments of
developing countries to prefer laws that attracted foreign direct investment.
From a purely economic perspective, such laws are often most attractive if
they do not hinder the activities of transnational corporations with
protections for the environment or human rights. In the end, the rights of
individuals and communities in developing countries that are affected by the
operations of transnational corporations lose out to the power of neo-
classical economic development theory and the pursuit of profit.
C. A Fragmented Body of Law
The lack of a multilateral framework left a void, specifically the lack of
an international organization or targeted international agreements. Bilateral
investment treaties are flourishing in this vacuum as a means of regulating
foreign direct investment.35 Bilateral investment treaties are the progeny of
Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, a form of international
agreement that was common among colonizing countries.36 Treaties of
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation allocated rights to colonial
territories among colonizing countries to avoid war between the colonizing
countries.
The number of bilateral investment treaties being entered into each year
is increasing at a rapid pace. According to the U.N. Conference on Trade
and Development, approximately four times as many bilateral investment
treaties were entered into in the 1990s as were entered into during the
34. Mobility varies based on a variety of factors, including timing and the
availability of resources. It is harder to move once a transnational corporation has invested
in projects that cannot be moved like infrastructure projects. Transnational corporations
engaged in resource extraction are limited to locations where oil or other resources are
available.
35. One explanation for the proliferation of bilateral investment treaties is the
concerns of investors regarding political risk and corruption in host countries. I do not intend
to suggest that the concerns of investors are invalid. However, the need to address investors'
valid concerns does not negate the need to shape laws to also protect the rights of citizens
and communities in host countries.
36. See M. SORNARAJAH, INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 229 (1994).
For a discussion of the development from primarily diplomatic protection of foreign direct
investment to bilateral investment treaties, see William S. Dodge, Investor-State Dispute
Settlement Between Developed Countries: Reflections on the Australia-United States Free
Trade Agreement, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 5-9 (2006).
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1980s.37 Approximately ninety percent of the world's countries have
entered into bilateral investment treaties.38
The substance of post-World War II bilateral investment treaties has not
changed substantially over time, and they still omit many rights of and
protections for individuals and communities in host countries.3 9 However,
bilateral investment treaties differ from Treaties of Friendship, Commerce,
and Navigation in several respects. Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation focused on the broad promotion of trade and commercial
relationships. Bilateral investment treaties are narrower because they focus
on investment, target less developed countries, and allow direct investor
claims prior to exhausting local remedies.4n Modern bilateral investment
treaties focus on specific rights of and protections for foreign direct
investment by nationals of countries that are a party to the treaty. This shift
and the steady increase in bilateral investment treaties highlight the gap in
the regulation of foreign direct investment by international law.
In part, the shift in the scope of bilateral investment treaties can be
explained by the successful creation of the WTO as a multinational
framework for international trade law. In the post-World War II period, the
GATT was ratified and implemented. Since its implementation in 1947, the
GATT, and later, the WTO Agreements facilitated the development and
reform of international trade law. Broad goals of promoting trade and
commercial relationships addressed in Treaties of Friendship, Commerce,
and Navigation were subsumed into the GATT and the WTO Agreements.
Bilateral investment treaties address issues that are beyond the scope of the
WTO's activities.
In more recent years, foreign direct investment issues are increasingly
incorporated into multilateral, regional, and bilateral trade agreements such
as the WTO Agreements on Trade-Related Investment Measures, the
General Agreement on Trade in Services, and the North American Free
Trade Agreement.4 ' Despite the incorporation of foreign direct investment
issues into international trade agreements, foreign direct investment remains
predominantly regulated by bilateral investment treaties and principles
derived from customary international law."
37. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], Bilateral
Investment Treaties, 1959-1999, iii, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIAI2 (Dec. 2000), available
at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/poiteiiad2.en.pdf.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 20.
40. See Dodge, supra note 36, at 14.
41. Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and
Investment Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 48,
50 (2008).
42. See, e.g., id. at 48; cf David Schneiderman, Investment Rules and the New
Constitutionalism, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 757, 768 (2000) ("An interlocking network of
rules for the protection and liberalization of [foreign direct investment] can be found in
[bilateral investment treaties], in regional trade agreements such as NAFTA and the
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Bilateral investment treaties represent an important site for the formation
of foreign direct investment law. The shift from treaties of Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation to bilateral investment treaties represents a shift
from North-North agreements to North-South agreements.43  Modem
bilateral investment treaties give investors even more advantages than under
treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation. Bilateral investment
treaties do not require the exhaustion of local remedies before allowing
investors to file direct claims.44  Bilateral investment treaties limit
interference by host countries in the foreign activities of transnational
corporations within their territorial jurisdiction. Customary international
law and bilateral investment treaties protect the assets of transnational
corporations in developing countries from uncompensated expropriation or
nationalization. However, they do not generally promote comprehensive
protections for individuals or communities in host countries.
Despite windows of opportunity and sporadic efforts by the international
community, international law governing foreign direct investment has not
moved far from the rules and principles that governed and protected
colonial trading companies. Modern foreign direct investment law
continues to protect the rights of transnational corporations. This
encourages direct foreign investment by private actors despite potential
risks and significant changes in the global economy. As a result, reforms
are piecemeal and foreign direct investment law remains fragmented. Left
unreformed, transnational corporations are allowed and even encouraged to
act with impunity in ways that are harmful to individuals and communities
in the countries in which they operate. Proposals to reform foreign direct
investment law should capitalize on growing political will to reform the
international economic system.
European Energy Charter Treaty, and at the multilateral level in the Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures (TRIMs). The World Bank has issued Guidelines on the Legal
Treatment of Foreign Investment, and a similar set of nonbinding investment principles has
been agreed to in Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), while the OECD attempted,
unsuccessfully, to complete the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) to which other
states outside the OECD would have been invited to accede.") (citations omitted).
43. Dodge, supra note 36, at 14. However, more recently, bilateral investment
treaties have been used to structure relationships between developing countries. One
question this trend raises is whether this will result in a shift in the substance of bilateral
investment treaties that is more beneficial to the citizens and communities in developing
countries. See Larry CatA Backer & Augusto Molina, Cuba and the Construction of
Alternative Global Trade Systems: ALBA and Free Trade in the Americas, 31 U. PA. J. INT'L
L. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 153, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1407705)
(discussing certain bilateral investment agreements among developing countries).
44. Dodge, supra note 36, at 13-14.
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I. EFFORTS TO REGULATE TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
Although state initiatives to develop a global multilateral agreement on
foreign direct investment were unsuccessful, there are some noteworthy
initiatives. This section discusses selected examples, including the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the U.N. Code of Conduct on
Transnational Corporations, and Protect, Respect and Remedy: A
Framework for Business and Human Rights. Non-governmental
organizations and private sector entities have also put forth several
initiatives. This section is not intended to be a comprehensive survey of
initiatives, but rather to highlight points on a trajectory toward Corporate
Social Responsibility and Corporate Social Accountability.
A. OECD Guidelines
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD") developed a set of voluntary guidelines that had some success.4 5
The OECD membership is comprised of more developed countries and was
established by the 1960 Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development.46 In 1962, the OECD published the Draft
Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property.47 This convention never
went into effect. However, later efforts by the OECD were more successful.
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises ("OECD
Guidelines") is a voluntary code of conduct OECD member countries
45. Similar initiatives are set out in documents such as the Basel Principles, the
Equator Principles, and the IFC Performance Standards. See Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A
Revised Framework (Nov. 2005), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl 18.pdf; The "Equator
Principles": A Financial Industry Benchmark for Determining, Assessing, and Managing
Social & Environmental Risk in Project Financing (July 2006), http://www.equator-
principles.com/documents/Equator_-Principles.pdf; International Finance Corporation [IFC],
Performance Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability (Apr. 30, 2006), http://
www.ifc.org/ifcext/sustainability.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/polPerformanceStandards2006-
full/$FILE/IFC+Performance+Standards.pdf.
46. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Convention
on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (1960),
http://www.oecd.org/document/7/0,3343,en-2649_201185.1915847_1_1-l-1,00.html (last
visited Sept. Ii, 2009) (stating that the founding member countries were Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, the Republic of Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the Swiss Confederation,
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States).
47. See OECD, Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, 2 I.L.M.
241 (1962). The OECD adopted a revised version in 1967. See also OECD, Draft
Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, Oct. 12, 1967, O.E.C.D. Pub. No. 23081,
reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 117 (1968).
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adopted in 1976.48 The OECD Guidelines address a range of issues,
including labor and the environment.49 Although the OECD Guidelines
themselves are voluntary standards, each country that adopts them is
obligated to establish a National Contact Point to promote and implement
the OECD Guidelines. Numerous cases have been brought under the
OECD Guidelines. ° When a company is believed to be in breach of the
OECD Guidelines, any interested party can raise the case with the
appropriate National Contact Point. National Contact Points have had
varying success.5' The OECD Guidelines are currently being reviewed and
a revised set of guidelines is expected to be completed by mid-201 0.52
B. U.N. Initiatives
The United Nations also attempted to address the question of regulating
transnational corporations. Although the United Nations was unsuccessful
in its efforts to achieve a mandatory, legally-binding framework for
transnational corporations, it has had some success with developing
voluntary guidelines.
The U.N. Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations is an early
attempt by the United Nations to develop hard law rules governing foreign
direct investment. The U.N. Economic and Social Council requested the
drafting of a code of conduct for transnational corporations in 1982."3 In
1984, the Intergovernmental Working Group on a Code of Conduct drafted
the U.N. Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations.54 It addressed a
wide range of issues including human rights, environmental issues, and
48. For more on the early years of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises, see, e.g., DUNCAN C. CAMPBELL & RICHARD L. ROWAN, MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES AND THE OECD INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS GUIDELINES (1983).
49. OECD, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (1976),
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf.
50. Over 200 cases have been filed with to National Contact Points between 2000
and 2009. OECD, Summary Report of the 2009 Annual Meeting of the National Contact
Points 2 (2009), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/25/43753441.pdf.
51. See Amanda Perry Kessaris, Corporate Liability for Environmental Harm, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Malgosia Fitzmaurice &
David Ong eds., forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 13-14), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1087548 (discussing examples of environmental issues considered
by the National Contact Points); see generally OECD Watch, The OECD Guidelines for
MNEs: Are They 'Fit for the Job'? (June 2009), available at
http://oecdwatch.org/publications-en/Publication_3201/atdownload/fullfile.
52. See OECD Watch, OECD Watch Open Letter to the OECD Council at
Ministerial Level (June 23, 2009), available at http://oecdwatch.org/publications-
en/Publication_3104/at download/fullfile.
53. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Res. 1982/68, IT 3-4, 6, U.N. Doc.
E/1982/68 (Oct. 27, 1982).
54. U.N. Draft International Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, U.N.
Doc. E/C. 10/1984/S/5 (May 29, 1984).
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respect for social and cultural objectives and policies." However, the
drafters were unable to reach agreement on all issues and the United
Nations never adopted the U.N. Code of Conduct on Transnational
Corporations. Among other issues, the drafters did not resolve whether the
U.N. Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations would be a
universally applicable, legally binding framework or a voluntary guideline
for transnational corporations. 6
Continuing the success it achieved developing soft law norms, the
United Nations launched the U.N. Global Compact in 2000. The U.N.
Global Compact is a voluntary international policy initiative that seeks to
align the interests of business, governments, civil society, labor, and the
United Nations. The U.N. Global Compact focuses on public
accountability, transparency, and disclosure as tools to further "a more
sustainable and inclusive global economy. 57  It promotes ten core
principles that are grouped into four categories: human rights, labor,
environment, and anti-corruption. Although its effectiveness is disputed,
the U.N. Global Compact has over 5,000 business participants in 135
58
countries.
In a subsequent attempt to regulate transnational corporations, the U.N.
Working Group on the Working Methods and Activities of Transnational
Corporations began drafting the Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to
Human Rights. 59  The Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights
are based on human rights standards and numerous legal documents,
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 60 The U.N. Sub-Commission on the
55. See id.
56. ECOSOC, Comm'n on Transnational Corps., Report of the Secretariat on the
Outstanding Issues in the Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, 23 I.L.M.
602, 614 (1984).
57. U.N. Global Compact, Corporate Citizenship in the World Economy 2 (Oct.
2008), available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/8.1/GC-brochure_
FINAL.pdf.
58. U.N. Global Compact, Annual Review 2008, at 5 (Mar. 2009), available at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/newsevents/9. I _newsarchives/2009 04 08/GC_20
08AR_FINAL.pdf.
59. ECOSOC, Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and Prot. of H.R., Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard
to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 13, 2003).
60. In the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, the Sub-Commission on the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights states "that transnational corporations and other business
enterprises, their officers and persons working for them are also obligated to respect
generally recognized responsibilities and norms contained in United Nations treaties and
other international instruments." Id. at 2.
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Promotion and Protection of Human Rights approved the Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights on August 13, 2003.61 However,
the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights is a soft law document,
and therefore, did not establish mandatory rules for transnational
corporations.62 The strength of the Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to
Human Rights lies in the potential for soft law to shape voluntary behavior,
become the basis for developing binding treaties, influence public opinion,
and document political will.
In 2005, the Commission on Human Rights recognized the relationship
between transnational corporations and human rights.63 Further, the
Commission on Human Rights requested the Secretary-General to appoint a
special representative for human rights and transnational corporations and
other business enterprises. 64 John Ruggie was appointed the U.N. Special
Representative of the Secretary General on Human Rights. In June of 2008,
John Ruggie submitted his final report to the Human Rights Council
("Ruggie Report"). This report set out a framework with three core
principles: "the State duty to protect against human rights abuses by third
parties, including business; the corporate responsibility to respect human
rights; and the need for more effective access to remedies., 65 The Ruggie
Report and its related documents set out current perspectives on the
relationship between business and human rights at the international level.66
Although the Ruggie Report mentions environmental issues, its primary
focus is the relationship between business and human rights. The Ruggie
Report is an important step toward comprehensive laws regulating foreign
direct investment by transnational corporations. It identifies a conceptual
and policy framework that can integrate laws and regulations with other
measures to address human rights abuses.
61. Id.
62. ECOSOC, Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and Prot. of H.R., Res. 2003/16, at 52,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/L. 1 (2003).
63. Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights [OHCHR], Human Rights
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprise, U.N. Comm'n on H.R. Res.
2005/69, at 1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/L.10/Add.17 (Apr. 20, 2005), available at
http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/CHR/resolutions/E-CN_4-RES-2005-69.doc.
64. Id.
65. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Report of the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, delivered to the Human Rights Council, U.N.
Doc. AIHRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (prepared by John Ruggie), available at http://www.reports-
and-materials.org/Ruggie-report-7-Apr-2008.pdf [hereinafter Ruggie Report].
66. Christiana Ochoa, The 2008 Ruggie Report: A Framework for Business and
Human Rights, ASIL INSIGrTS, June 18, 2008, http://www.asil.org/insights080618.cfm#
_edn 1.
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C. Private Sector Initiatives
The private sector put forward several initiatives in the second half of the
twentieth century.67 More recently, a group of institutional investors
engaged in the development of the Principles for Responsible Investment at
the request of the U.N. Secretary-General.68 The U.N. Environment
Programme Finance Initiative and the U.N. Global Compact coordinated the
process. 69 The voluntary Principles for Responsible Investment require
signatories to incorporate environmental, social, and corporate governance
issues into their investment decision-making processes and ownership
practices. In July 2009, there were over 550 signatories to the Principles for
Responsible Investment.
70
Private sector initiatives are necessarily voluntary, and so far, successful
multilateral efforts to regulate transnational corporations are also voluntary.
However, financial crises and the stock market crash of 2008 called into
question the neoclassical economical model and principle of non-
interference into the economic activities of private actors. Voluntary
measures are insufficient because foreign direct investment law does not
create incentives for officers and directors of transnational corporations to
act in a way that would result in a more equitable distribution of economic
development and prosperity. Instead, foreign direct investment law grants
rights to and protects the rights of transnational corporations without
establishing corresponding obligations. Without enforceable legal
67. Early efforts to draft multilateral agreements governing foreign direct investment
included the 1957 Draft International Convention for the Mutual Protection of Private
Property Rights in Foreign Countries. Soc'Y TO ADVANCE THE PROT. OF FOREIGN INV.,
DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE MUTUAL PROTECTION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES (1957). Also, European business leaders and attorneys
proposed the 1959 Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention of Investments Abroad, but it never
went into effect. The Proposed Convention to Protect Foreign Investment: A Round Table, 9
J. PUB. L. 115 (1960). The failures of these attempts are highlighted by the 1959 signing of
the first bilateral investment treaty, a treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments,
F.R.G.-Pack., Nov. 25, 1959, 457 U.N.T.S. 24.
68. Principles for Responsible Investment, About, http://www.unpri.org/about/ (last
visited Oct. 21, 2009).
69. Id.
70. There are 616 signatories to the Principles for Responsible Investment, including
some of the top financial companies in the world such as BNP Paribas-France ($2,969,315
million total assets), HSBC-United Kingdom ($2,527,465 million total assets), JPMorgan-
United States ($2,175,052 million total assets), and Mitsubishi ($2,200,818 million total
assets). Principles for Responsible Investment, Signatories, http://www.unpri.org/
signatories/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2009). The data on total assets is for 2008 and these
companies ranked 1 I th, 5th, 29th, and 38th, respectively, among the top fifty financial
companies in the world in 2008. UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2009: Transnational
Corporations, Agricultural Production and Development 234, U.N. Doc.
UNCTADIWIR/2009 (Sept. 17, 2009), available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/
ditedir/docs/wir2009top50 geospread-en.pdf.
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obligations, parties injured by transnational corporations will continue to
have insufficient legal protections and avenues to seek legal remedies.
III. TRANSFORMING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT LAW
Transforming foreign direct investment law requires rethinking the role
of corporations, and particularly transnational corporations, in society. The
debate about the role and responsibilities of public corporations is not new.
In the United States, corporations generally are considered to have a
primarily economic function with corresponding economic goals and
responsibilities. This economic function is then tempered by legal and
ethical restraints while still allowing corporations to take on discretionary
responsibilities such as philanthropy.7' However, the primacy of the
economic function is questioned by both practitioners and theorists, and
these voices became louder and gained broader credence in light of the
recent financial crises. Nonetheless, however one comes out on this
question, there is general agreement that corporations do not enjoy
unlimited power. Legal and ethical restraints set the limits of corporate
activity. Thus, the question remains where lines should be drawn and what
constraints should be applied to corporate activity.
Although it may be more difficult to make the close calls, there is a
strong argument to be made that certain core values are so important that
they should be protected by law. These include human rights and
environmental protection. This section discusses Corporate Social
Responsibility and Accountability Movements, the emergence of Global
Corporate Citizenship in the business and management literature, and
opportunities and challenges for reform.
A. Corporate Social Responsibility and Accountability
Generally, when U.S. legal scholars question the role of corporations in
society, they do so either in the context of Corporate Social Responsibility,
Corporate Social Accountability, or both. These theoretical frameworks can
be traced back to arguments advanced by E. Merrick Dodd in a debate
between Adolph Berle and E. Merrick Dodd in the 1930s.72 Berle
71. See Jeffrey P. Katz, Diane L. Swanson & Lori K. Nelson, Culture-Based
Expectations of Corporate Citizenship: A Propositional Framework and Comparison of Four
Cultures, 9 INT'L J. OF ORG. ANALYSIS 149, 151 (2001) (discussing Archie B. Caroll, A
Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate Performance, 4 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV.
497 (1979)).
72. Larry Cat Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transactional Law: The United
Nations' Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of
Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287,
298-99 (2006).
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essentially argued for the primacy of obligations to shareholders.73 Dodd
essentially argued that corporations have responsibilities to shareholders
and societal stakeholders. The roots of the modern legal discourse on
Corporate Social Responsibility are in Dodd's position.74 In more recent
decades, the Corporate Social Accountability movement expanded the
discourse.75
The exact scope and contours of Corporate Social Responsibility are
disputed within the U.S. legal discourse,76 and they also vary from country
to country. However, it is fair to say that Corporate Social Responsibility
relates to the scope of ethical obligations that corporations have to
shareholders, societal stakeholders, and society as a whole. In corporate
legal theory, Corporate Social Responsibility generally focuses on economic
and governance issues. The underlying question revolves around the
purpose of the corporation. In the U.S. corporate law context, the rules
governing Corporate Social Responsibility tend to be found in state and
federal statutes. These "hard laws" are generally enforceable in a court of
law.
In international legal theory, Corporate Social Responsibility generally
focuses on human rights. The underlying question revolves around what
constitutes acceptable conduct from a moral and societal standpoint. In
international and transnational business, the rules governing Corporate
Social Responsibility tend to be found in codes of conduct or documents
produced by international organizations. These types of "soft law" tend to
be non-binding and unenforceable in a court of law. In U.S. legal discourse,
domestic corporate governance and international human rights occasionally
have uncomfortable meetings. However, they have not yet been integrated
into one overarching theoretical framework.
The Corporate Social Accountability movement attempts to implement
the principles of Corporate Social Responsibility as legally enforceable
"hard law." Among other things, Corporate Social Accountability is an
attempt to link human rights, the environment, and other societal issues to
the economic and corporate governance concerns of corporations. This can
take the form of disclosure rules, national and international standards, and
legal liability for the social and environmental effects of corporate actions.
Corporate Social Accountability is a shift from Corporate Social
Responsibility because it moves from a discussion of moral and ethical
obligations and responsibilities to a discussion of socially and legally
73. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 H~Av. L. REV.
1049 (1931).
74. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARv.
L. REV. 1145, 1147 (1932).
75. See Backer, supra note 72, at 300-01.
76. For a categorization of the positions taken on Corporate Social Responsibility in
the U.S. legal discourse, see Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era
of Economic Globalization, 35 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 705, 711-20 (2002).
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enforceable obligations and responsibilities. Accordingly, Corporate Social
Accountability is more instrumental than theoretical. It allows us to link
domestic corporate governance with international human rights, but it does
not offer a comprehensive theoretical framework for bridging gaps between
the interests of shareholders and societal stakeholders.
There are many options for reframing foreign direct investment law,
some more traditional and some more novel.77 An alternative that some
scholars have suggested is the multilateral negotiation of foreign direct
investment law in a new international organization. The idea is that such an
organization would do for foreign direct investment what the GATT and the
WTO have done for international trade.78 Another option would be to
strengthen the role of the WTO in regulating foreign direct investment law.
Alternatively, a non-governmental organization, also known as civil society,
like the International Labor Organization, could be created in the area of
foreign direct investment. Codes of conduct and other soft law options
present further alternatives. Scholars have argued that these forms of non-
binding soft law can contribute to the creation of responsibilities and
obligations over time.79
A new international institution might be able to reduce fragmentation in
international foreign direct investment law but would not necessarily be
ideally equipped to reduce the asymmetries discussed above. A new
international institution would be only one piece of the puzzle. Without the
development of a new theoretical framework and mandate, such an
institution may be insufficiently novel to resolve the underlying
asymmetries. These asymmetries must be resolved to bring foreign direct
investment law into the twenty-first century.
B. The Emergence of Global Corporate Citizenship
Global Corporate Citizenship 80 offers a useful theoretical framework
with which to integrate and analyze the interests of shareholders and
societal stakeholders in this age of globalization. Global Corporate
77. The need to reform foreign direct investment law is not a new issue and there is a
wealth of scholarship on legal and policy regimes that have the potential to affect and
transform foreign direct investment law. See, e.g., LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT (Daniel D. Bradlow & Alfred Escher eds., 1999).
78. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, National Regulation of Multinational
Enterprises: An Essay on Comity, Extraterritoriality, and Harmonization, 42 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 5 (2003) (proposing a model for analyzing the application of national laws to
multinational enterprises operating within their territories).
79. See, e.g., Mary E. Footer, The Role of 'Soft' Law Norms in Reconciling the
Antinomies of WTO Law (July 14, 2008), available at SSRN:
http://ssm.comabstract=l 159929.
80. "Global Corporate Citizenship" seems to be the term that is predominantly used
in the management literature. "Global Business Citizenship" seems to be the term that is
predominantly used in the business literature.
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Citizenship posits that corporations have rights and obligations in society
similar to citizens. It addresses the ethical responsibilities of companies
operating in a global market and the values that should guide corporations'
engagement with society.8s  In effect, principles of Global Corporate
Citizenship require corporations to engage with shareholders and societal
stakeholders as well as act as stakeholders themselves.
Global Corporate Citizenship is already influential in terms of policy and
practice in several areas. International institutions are endorsing Global
Corporate Citizenship as a framework for international development and
economic policy. Many transnational corporations have incorporated
Global Corporate Citizenship into their business goals and policies.82
Management and business scholars began theorizing Global Corporate
Citizenship in the 1990s, and a substantial body of scholarship developed
since that time.83 Global Corporate Citizenship has been defined a variety
of ways.8 While the definitions vary, there are substantial commonalities.
For example, corporations have direct duties to local, regional, national, and
global societal stakeholders. Societal stakeholders include individuals,
employees, shareholders, customers, suppliers, and communities where
corporations conduct business and serve markets. Some scholars go further
and argue that corporations should understand themselves as societal
stakeholders with duties to contribute to the well-being of the world in
general in addition to their duties to individual stakeholders and groups of
stakeholders.85
81. World Economic Forum, Corporate Global Citizenship: The Leadership
Challenge for CEOs and Boards 6 (2002), http://www.weforum.org/pdf/GCCI/GCC-
CEOstatement.pdf. Scholars do not agree on one definition of "Global Corporate
Citizenship." In part, this discussion follows the lines of the universalism versus cultural
relativism debate. For an argument in support of a universal definition, see Jacob Dahl
Rendtorff, Towards Ethical Guidelines for International Business Corporations: Aspects of
Global Corporate Citizenship, http://www.isbee.org/index.php?option=com-docman&task=
docdownload&gid=247&ltemid=39.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2009).
82. For example, the Boeing web site announces that Global Corporate Citizenship is
one of Boeing's core values and the Mitsubishi Corporation has added a "Global Corporate
Citizenship" section to the its web site. Boeing, Global Corporate Citizenship,
http://www.boeing.com/companyoffices/aboutus/community/ (last visited on Oct. 16, 2009);
Mitsubishi Corporation, Corporate Citizenship, http://www.mitsubishicorp.comjp/en/csr/
(last visited Oct. 16, 2009).
83. See, e.g., HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON GLOBAL CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP
(Andreas Georg Scherer & Guido Palazzo eds., Edward Elgar, 2008); Klaus Schwab, Global
Corporate Citizenship: Working With Governments and Civil Society, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-
Feb. 2008, at 107, 111-12; Grahame F. Thompson, Global Corporate Citizenship: What
Does it Mean?, 9 COMPETITION AND CHANGE 131, 131-52 (2005); see also Creative
Capitalism, Corporate Social Confusion, http://creativecapitalism.typepad.con
creative capitalism/2008/08/corporate-socia.html (last visited July I1, 2009) (suggesting that
these issues are also being discussed by economists).
84. See, e.g., DAVID LOGAN ET AL., GLOBAL CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP: RATIONALE
AND STRATEGIES 6 (1997); Schwab, supra note 83, at 108.
85. Schwab, supra note 83, at 108, 114.
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There is not universal agreement on the scope of Global Corporate
Citizenship. Some management scholars view Global Corporate
Citizenship as an umbrella for various forms of Corporate Social
Responsibility. 6 Others claim that Global Corporate Citizenship is one of
five core aspects of business engagement along with corporate governance,
corporate philanthropy, corporate social responsibility, and corporate social
entrepreneurship. 7 Going forward, this question will also need to be
addressed in the legal context. However, human rights and environmental
protection are core values that fall easily within the scope of Global
Corporate Citizenship.
The underlying values of Global Corporate Citizenship are recognized by
an increasing number of corporations and business leaders. 8 Corporations
are becoming increasingly engaged in promoting Global Corporate
Citizenship as a result of a lack of global leadership in the political, policy,
governance, and legal fields. 89 In 2003, Chief Executive Officers of over
seventy transnational corporations9 published a joint statement with the
World Economic Forum. This statement set out a framework for the
implementation of Global Corporate Citizenship principles in the business
context. 9' The integration of Global Corporate Citizenship into the policies
of transnational corporations has moved beyond the group of companies and
Chief Executive Officers associated with the joint statement. Transnational
corporations have begun including Global Corporate Citizenship into the
portfolios of their in-house counsel.92
86. Lee E. Preston & Danielle Mihalko, Corporate Responsibility: Comparative
Analysis of Current Documents, in PRINCIPLES OF STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT 21, 46
(1999), available at http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/ccbe/Other/Principles%20of%
20Stakeholder%2oManagement.pdf.
87. Schwab, supra note 83, at 110.
88. See, e.g., The Conference Board, The Expanding Parameters of Global Corporate
Citizenship, rep. 1246 (1999), in COMMUNICATING THE FUTURE (The Conference Board ed.
1999).
89. Schwab, supra note 83, at 108-09.
90. The corporations represented included ABB Limited, Abbott Laboratories, Abril
Group, Accenture, Anglo American PIc, Anglovaal Mining Limited, Aramex International,
Arthur D. Little Inc., Artoc Group for Investment & Development, Ayala Corporation, Bajaj
Auto Limited, The Boots Company PLC, Budimex SA, Carlson Companies, The Coca-Cola
Company, Corporacion Nacional del Cobre de Chile (Codelco Chile), Deloitte Touche
Tohmatsu, Deutsche Bank Group, DHL Worldwide Express, Diageo plc, Electricit6 de
France (EDF), Empresas Polar, Fleetboston Global Bank, Infosys Technologies Ltd, ING
Group, Lafarge, McDonald's Corporation, Merck & Co., Inc., MTR Corporation Ltd,
Organizaq6es Globo, Phillips-Van Heusen Corporation, PricewaterhouseCoopers
International Limited, Renault, Rio Tinto Plc, Royal Ahold, S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc.,
Siemens AG, Statoil ASA, Thames Water Pic, Transnet Ltd, UBS AG, WMC Resources
Limited, and Xenel Industries Limited.
91. See generally World Economic Forum, supra note 81.
92. See, e.g., Joe W. (Chip) Pitts II1, Business, Human Rights, & the Environment:
The Role of the Lawyer in CSR & Ethical Globalization, 26 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 479, 482
(2008).
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In addition to its integration into business policy and practice, Global
Corporate Citizenship is also becoming institutionalized at the international
level. For example, Global Corporate Citizenship is being promulgated by
international institutions such as the U.N. Global Compact and the World
Economic Forum.93 The U.N. Global Compact 94 is a public-private
initiative that seeks to promote ten principles that focus on human rights,
labor standards, the environment, and anti-corruption. 9  The World
Economic Forum is a Swiss non-profit foundation that focuses on values
and rules shaping corporate governance and ensuring that economic
progress and social development go hand-in-hand.96 The U.N. Global
Compact and the World Economic Forum support the creation of a
framework that incorporates values and morals into corporate governance
and transnational operations while simultaneously taking the interests of
shareholders and societal stakeholders into consideration - key principles
of Global Corporate Citizenship.
Although legal scholars noted as early as 2002 that the concept of Global
Corporate Citizenship had entered the business lexicon, it has received only
minimal resonance in the U.S. legal discourse.97 There has not yet been an
attempt to develop a theoretical framework for Global Corporate
Citizenship in the legal context. Global Corporate Citizenship has been
93. For examples of the Global Compact and the World Economic Forum on Global
Corporate Citizenship, see, e.g., Gavin Power, Who Cares Wins: The Convergence of Global
Corporate Citizenship and Financial Markets, Keynote Speech at the Investment
Management Institute Conference (Jan. 6, 2006), available at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news-events/9.6/power-miami_060106.pdf; World
Economic Forum, supra note 81; U.N. Global Compact, Advancing Corporate Citizenship
(June 2005), http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/about the.gc/2.0.2.pdf.
94. For more on the Global Compact, see generally Evaristus Oshionebo, The U.N.
Global Compact and Accountability of Transnational Corporations: Separating Myth From
Realities, 19 FLA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2007); Surya Deva, Global Compact: A Critique of the
U.N. 's "Public-Private" Partnership for Promoting Corporate Citizenship, 34 SYRACUSE J.
INT'L L. & CoM. 107 (2006); William H. Meyer & Boyka Stefanova, Human Rights, the UN
Global Compact, and Global Governance, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 501 (2001); Ambassador
Betty King, The UN Global Compact: Responsibility For Human Rights, Labor Relations,
And The Environment In Developing Nations, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 481 (2001); Alexis M.
Taylor, The UN and the Global Compact, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 975(2001).
95. United Nations, About the Global Compact: The Ten Principles,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html (last visited
Oct. 20, 2009).
96. See World Economic Forum, Our Organization: World Class Governance,
http:/lwww.weforum.org/en/about/Our%200rganization/index.htm (last visited Oct. 20,
2009).
97. See, e.g., Eric W. Orts, War and the Business Corporation, 35 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 549, 556 (2002) (noting that the concept of Global Corporate Citizenship had
entered the business lexicon). Searches on July 11, 2009 for "global corporate citizenship"
resulted in only 28 hits on Westlaw, 21 hits on Lexis, and 3 hits on SSRN. Searches on July
I1, 2008 for "global business citizenship" resulted in only 2 hits on Westlaw, 2 hits on Lexis,
and 2 hits on SSRN.
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mentioned briefly in several international law articles in connection with
descriptions or discussions of the Global Compact 98 and the Millennium
Development Goals.' While some legal articles mention Global Corporate
Citizenship in discussions of Corporate Social Responsibility and human
rights,""° others go further and contemplate the definition of a good global
corporate citizen or propose regulating accountability for Global Corporate
Citizenship.'0 ' A few legal articles briefly mention Global Corporate
Citizenship in discussing how non-governmental organizations can
strengthen their international roles and the role of non-governmental
organizations in building global democracy.0 2 Still others briefly mention
the role that policymakers have in promoting Global Corporate Citizenship
and how the tax advice of law firms and accounting firms may undermine
Global Corporate Citizenship.
10 3
98. Adrienne Bernhard, Response: Sara L. Seck, Home State Responsibility and
Local Communities: The Case of Global Mining, II YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 207, 213
(2008); Luis E. Cuervo, OPEC from Myth To Reality, 30 Hous. J. INT'L L. 433, 489 (2008);
Deva, supra note 94 at 136; Paul Redmond, Transnational Enterprise and Human Rights:
Options for Standard Setting and Compliance, 37 INT'L LAW. 69, 100 (2003); Erin Elizabeth
Macek, Scratching the Corporate Back: Why Corporations Have No Incentive to Define
Human Rights, I I MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 101, 122 (2002).
99. Cuervo, supra note 98, at 550-51; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Building Global
Democracy, I CHI. J. INT'L L. 223, 227 (2000).
100. Caroline Kaeb, Emerging Issues of Human Rights Responsibility in the
Extractive and Manufacturing Industries: Patterns and Liability Risks, 6 Nw. U. J. INT'L
HUM. RTS. 327, 353 (2008); Pitts III, supra note 92, at 482; Gary Lynch-Wood, The Market
for Virtue: The Potential and Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility by David Vogel, 19 J.
ENvTL. L. 145, 146 (2007) (reviewing DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE
POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (2005)).
101. Symposium, The Multinational Enterprise as Global Corporate Citizen, 21
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. I, 12-14 (2001); Joel R. Paul, Holding Multinational
Corporations Responsible under International Law, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
285, 295 (2001) ("Halina Ward discusses the concept of global corporate citizenship. Ward
argues that there is a 'governance deficit' created by the power disparities between
developing countries and global corporations. In her view, the equities of the situation
demand that the 'flipside' of foreign direct investment should be 'foreign direct liability' and
that the home country of the multinationals should insist that they are subject to the same
standards of conduct abroad as they are at home. Ward suggests that the threat of liability
could pressure multinational corporations to conform their behavior to international
standards. She proposes an international convention to regulate foreign direct investment that
would empower developing countries to hold multinational corporations accountable as
global citizens.").
102. Cuervo, supra note 98, at 603-04; Slaughter, supra note 99, at 227.
103. Ethan S. Burger et al., KPMG and "Abusive" Tax Shelters: Key Ethical
Implications for Legal and Accounting Professionals, 31 J. LEGAL PROF. 43, 51 (2007)
(stating that "by crafting questionable tax shelters or encouraging lawmakers to look the
other way as profits and gains (both legitimate or otherwise) are routinely concealed in
offshore tax havens"); David Barnhizer, Waking from Sustainability's "Impossible Dream":
The Decisionmaking Realities of Business and Government, 18 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV.
595, 621 n.64 (2006).
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Developing Global Corporate Citizenship in the legal literature is an
opportunity to reframe foreign direct investment law and policy and
establish a legal theoretical framework that values ethics and morality as
well as the interests of shareholders and societal stakeholders. Global
Corporate Citizenship theory facilitates an analysis of the intersection of
corporate governance and human rights from a legal perspective. It allows
us to reframe foreign direct investment law so that we no longer focus
exclusively on the nature of the corporation, but instead we are also able to
focus on moral and ethical issues as they relate to transnational business.
The development of Global Corporate Citizenship as a theoretical
framework will make it possible to postulate that shareholder and
stakeholder interests are interrelated and to systematically develop, analyze,
and answer questions about the issues raised by their convergence.
C. Opportunities and Challenges for Reform
In 2008, business, economic, and financial institutions and systems
around the world were in a state of crisis. The United States experienced
the most severe financial disaster since the Great Depression and several
major U.S. investment banks failed. Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation seized Washington Mutual.
Merrill Lynch was sold to Bank of America. Goldman Sachs and Morgan
Stanley converted to bank holding companies. This financial crisis was not
limited to the United States; its reverberations were felt around the world.
Two banks in Iceland, Landesbanki and Glitnir, were seized. Yamamoto
Life, a Japanese life insurance company, filed for bankruptcy. Global stock
markets fell dramatically, and in some cases, the depreciation was the worst
since the stock market crash of 1929.
In an effort to stop the economic freefall, the U.S. government and
governments around the world took action. The Federal Housing Finance
Agency placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship. The
Federal Reserve stepped in to save American International Group from
insolvency. The U.S. government passed the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008. The governments of Belgium, the Netherlands,
and Luxembourg partially nationalized Fortis, a Benelux banking and
finance company. National governments set up rescue plans for numerous
major banks including the Swiss banks UBS and Credit Suisse. Several
countries including Australia, Austria, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, and Spain introduced or increased guarantees of
bank deposits. Several countries including Brazil, Iceland, Indonesia, and
Russia temporarily suspended trading on their stock markets. Several
countries including Iceland, Hungary, Pakistan, Serbia, and Ukraine
requested aid from the International Monetary Fund. However, although
these and other emergency measures may prevent total collapse of the
global economy, they do not suggest a model for the future.
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Despite periodic reforms to the global economic system, the task of
developing a comprehensive reform of foreign direct investment law
remains incomplete. If history is any predictor, the most recent cycle of
deregulation will end and we will enter a new cycle of increasing regulation
in an effort to prevent a repeat of the stock market crash of 2008 and related
financial crises. There are many vehicles for reform, whether through
harmonization of domestic regulations, revising standards for multilateral,
regional, and bilateral trade agreements, or the creation of a new
international organization for international investment. Regardless of the
vehicle, reforms should incorporate the development of a more consistent
and comprehensive legal framework for foreign direct investment.
The present economic crisis presents challenges and opportunities.'
°4
Decreased willingness of companies to invest during a financial crisis is
likely to increase competition for foreign investment among developing
nations. Increased competition for foreign capital further reduces the
likelihood of achieving an international consensus on the duty of states and
companies to protect citizens and communities in developing countries.
However, this is also an opportunity for governments and other societal
stakeholders to engage or become re-engaged in defining the role of
corporations in the global economy.'05 This question has long been left to
the corporate actors themselves and the theorizing of academics as a result
of a lack of global leadership in the political, policy, governance, and legal
fields.'O°
Law and policy in this area is ripe for development. Principles of Global
Corporate Citizenship can contribute to the reform of foreign direct
investment law. Principles of Global Corporate Citizenship can be
formalized and integrated into international law in multiple ways. 107 These
104. See generally Daniel Bradlow, Charting a Progressive Financial Agenda,
FOREIGN POL'Y IN Focus, Dec. 8, 2008, available at http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5723.
105. This applies to host countries and the countries of origin of transnational
corporations. Lack of laws or lack of enforcement of existing law in host countries is an
important contributing factor to exploitation by foreign investors as well as the proliferation
of bilateral investment treaties.
106. Schwab, supra note 83, at 108-09.
107. This raises numerous questions which I will flesh out in future articles. For
example, on what theory or theories of jurisdiction would a legal theory of Global Corporate
Citizenship rely? Addressing this question will have significant implications for the structure
of a mandatory legal framework. Theories of criminal jurisdiction and extradition offer
insights that may be useful in establishing jurisdiction in civil law for the protection of core
values. For a discussion of the five traditional theories of criminal jurisdiction, see generally
Blakesley, supra note 6, at 1110-1I. See also Christopher L. Blakesley, Autumn of The
Patriarch: The Pinochet Extradition Debacle and Beyond - Human Rights Clauses
Compared To Traditional Derivative Protections such as Double Criminality, 91 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1, 15(2000) ("Extradition is an admixture of national and international law.
It presents an interesting tension between principles of dualism and monism, between
sovereignty and cooperation and between comparative and international criminal law."
(citations omitted)).
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include multilateral, regional, and bilateral trade agreements; guidelines and
investment principles issued by international or multilateral organizations;
and domestic regulations. However, in each of these cases, the problem
remains that foreign direct investment law, as opposed to international trade
law, is being approached in a piecemeal manner.
There are numerous sources of norms and law that, read together, offer
standards by which protections for societal stakeholders can be judged. One
important source is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 10 8 For
example, the rights espoused by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
include "economic, social and cultural rights" and the right to "a social and
international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in [the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights] can be fully realized."' 9 Although
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is non-binding and aspirational,
it helps flesh out the meaning of the prosperity to which foreign direct
investment is believed to contribute.
This Article proposes transforming theories and practices of voluntary
Global Corporate Citizenship into a mandatory legal framework. This
framework would define the duties of transnational corporations to
contribute to sustaining and improving the world's well-being and identify
ways to incorporate this into binding and enforceable "hard law." Thus, a
legal theory of Global Corporate Citizenship requires the re-
conceptualization of the role of transnational corporations in the global
economy. The voluntary Global Corporate Citizenship measures taken by
transnational corporations, U.N. initiatives, and scholarship on human rights
and environmental, social, and governance issues provide a starting point
from which to determine the duties and obligations of transnational
corporations in a legal theory of Global Corporate Citizenship.
As transnational corporations expand their operations and their reliance
on contracting and sourcing in developing countries, there is an increasing
need to integrate environmental, social, and governance issues into
corporate decision-making. Environmental issues include climate change,
water scarcity, local environmental pollution and waste management, new
regulations expanding the boundaries of environmental product liability,
and new markets for environmental services and environmentally-friendly
products." ° Social issues include workplace health and safety, knowledge
and human capital management, labor and human rights issues within
companies and their supply chains, and government and community
108. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., Ist plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) (Dec. 10, 1948).
109. Id.
110. Ivo KNOEPFEL & GORDON HAGART, WHO CARES WINS INITIATIVE 2004-2008,
FUTURE PROOF?: EMBEDDING ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES IN
INVESTMENT MARKETS 1, 13 (2009), available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/
docs/newsevents/8. I/who careswins_29Jan09webversion.pdf.
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relations in developing countries." 1 Reforming international investment
law from a Global Corporate Citizenship perspective includes integrating
environmental and social issues into the duties and responsibilities of
transnational corporations."
2
Achieving the benefits of foreign direct investment requires managing a
delicate balance. On one hand, transnational corporations must be
sufficiently interested to invest despite potential risks. This means that
transnational corporations must determine that the risk is appropriate in
light of the expected returns. At the same time, the pendulum should not
swing so far that the potential negative effects of foreign direct investment
are ignored in the competition to attract foreign capital. Encouraging
foreign direct investment and providing protections for societal stakeholders
requires a comprehensive legal framework that balances the rights and
obligations of states, transnational corporations, and societal stakeholders." 3
CONCLUSION
A new theoretical framework should meet multiple criteria. It should
differentiate between different types of foreign direct investment." 4  It
should reflect the increasingly interlinked nature of global politics and
economics. It should take into consideration the substantial economic,
political, legal, and social influence of transnational corporations. It should
be able to address issues arising out of the extreme legal, economic, and
physical mobility of transnational corporations. It should promote
economic, social, and cultural rights. It should promote more ethical
economic activity that, in turn, promotes prosperity around the world.
Global Corporate Citizenship is a theoretical and practical framework that
has the potential to meet these criteria. Finally, it should be compatible with
the protect, respect, and remedy framework for business and human rights
set out in the Ruggie Report."
5
Ill. Id.
112. Admittedly, many host countries have laws that protect the environment. This is
to say that the problem in many cases is not the lack of applicable law but the lack of
enforcement. A legal framework for Global Corporate Citizenship will need to include a
viable enforcement structure to be effective.
113. Developing mandatory Global Corporate Citizenship for foreign direct
investment will necessarily implicate domestic law. This raises a series of policy issues,
which I will address in future articles.
114. The potential influence of foreign direct investment, whether for harm or for
good, differs from sector to sector. For example, the extraction and chemical industries may
have more of an effect on the environment while the effects of high tech and service
industries may be more likely to be felt in terms of employment and wages. Focusing on
specific sectors will facilitate a more differentiated analysis of foreign direct investment law
and help refine details of a legal framework for Global Corporate Citizenship.
115. See generally Ruggie Report, supra note 65.
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Political will to rethink the regulation of transnational corporations has
grown rapidly and exponentially. Successful reform of foreign direct
investment law requires new ways of thinking and a new theoretical
framework. A new approach should: (1) address substantive and procedural
challenges facing potential plaintiffs from developing countries, (2) take
into consideration the amount of economic, political, legal, and social
influence wielded by transnational corporations, (3) capitalize on the
growing political will to reform the international economic system, (4)
incorporate modem notions of human rights and sustainable development,
and (5) encourage moral and ethical business practices in transnational
economic activities. In future articles, I will set out a law and Global
Corporate Citizenship research agenda and propose options for the
implementation of more comprehensive regulation of transnational
corporations.
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